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Book Review: Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice
Kate Schick makes the case for the rediscovery of British philosopher Gillian Rose’s unique
but neglected voice. Engaging with the work of Benjamin, Honig, Zizek and Butler, she locates
Rose’s ideas within central debates in contemporary social theory: trauma and memory,
exclusion and difference, tragedy and messianic utopia. Liane Hartnett finds that this work is
a compelling invitation to read more Rose.
Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice. Kate Schick. Edinburgh University Press. July
2012.
Find this book: 
Gillian Rose (1947-1995) was a Jewish thinker and Brit ish Hegelian. Educated
at Oxf ord, Rose was a reader at the University of  Sussex f or many years
bef ore accepting a Chair of  Social and Polit ical Thought at the University of
Warwick. She was also an advisor to the Polish Commission f or the Future of
Auschwitz. Rose is perhaps best known f or her moving philosophical memoir,
Love’s Work, which was written when she was dying of  ovarian cancer.
However, Rose also wrote on a wide range of  topics including philosophy,
sociology and f aith. Her major works include The Melancholy Science, Hegel
Contra Sociology, The Dialectic of Nihilism, Broken Middle, Judaism and
Modernity and Mourning Becomes the Law.
Rose’s thought has inf luenced theologians, philosophers and poets: people
like Rowan Williams, John Milbank, Slavoj Z izek and Geof f rey Hill. Yet, she
remains a largely neglected philosopher. Kate Schick, lecturer at Victoria University of  Wellington,
suggests this is “partly because [Rose] is a dif f icult thinker, who revels in the dif f iculty of  her
philosophy, and partly because she is a creative thinker who f alls outside established and easily def ined
schools of  thought” (p.1.). Until now, the absence of  all but two books of  secondary literature on Rose
bear testament to this: Law and Transcendence: On the Unfinished Project of Gillian Rose by Vincent Lloyd;
and Against Innocence: Gillian Rose’s Reception and Gift of Faith by Andrew Shank. Schick’s book Gillian
Rose: A Good Enough Justice, then, is an important contribution to the recovery of  Rose’s thought. It
moves beyond theological readings of  Rose to of f er an accessible introduction to her thought,
underscoring Rose’s unique contribution to philosophy, polit ics and ethics.
Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice is part exegesis, part conversation with contemporary philosophy. The
f irst half  of  the book is dedicated to expounding Rose’s ‘speculative philosophy’, shaped by her
‘idiosyncratic’ readings of  Hegel, Adorno and Kierkegaard. The latter half  discusses some of  the polit ical
implications of  Rose’s thought. Entit led ‘speculative polit ics’, it attempts to situate Rose’s contribution
amidst debates in contemporary polit ical theory, between trauma and memory, cosmopolitanism and
dif f erence, tragedy and utopia. Much like Hannah Arendt, Bonnie Honig and Rosa Luxembourg, then, Schick
suggests Rose’s polit ical contribution lies in her ability to do the ‘work of  the middle’.
At the heart of  Schick’s reading of  Rose is an embrace of  the ‘broken middle’, or the rejection of  ideology
and ‘one-sidedness’, the euporia (or easy way) of  liberalism and postmodernism. For Rose, the
‘disembedded and disembodied rationality of  liberalism’ and postmodernism’s repudiation of  law and
reason, represent the avoidance of  the polit ical, the mundane, the everyday. Instead, she advocates a
‘struggle f illed approach’, which accepts and ‘negotiates’ the brokenness of  our thought and lived
experience. Rose suggests it is in this ‘equivocation of  the middle’ (p.42) ‘between the well-worn dualisms
of  universal and particular, law and ethics, potentiality and actuality’ (p.4) that our quest f or ‘a good enough
justice’ is situated. Rose’s evocation of  the symbols of  ‘cit ies’ powerf ully expresses this idea. Not f or
Rose, the city of  ‘Athens’ as symbol of  ‘modernity’ nor ‘Jerusalem’ as symbol of  ‘postmodernity’. Both these
city symbols, Rose suggests are based on Manichean logic or f alse dualisms. Their theoretical one-
sidedness can only lead to the polit ical rupture and despair of  the city of  ‘Auschwitz’ (p.77).  Instead, Rose
calls f or an embrace of  the complexity of  the third city, the city in which we live, ‘about which simple stories
cannot be (truthf ully) told’ (p. 79).
Thinking and acting in the ‘third city’ requires us to assume a way of  being that is manif estly against
‘ignorance’, ‘indif f erence’ and ‘innocence’. This calls f or an ‘anxiety- f illed pursuit of  comprehension of
ourselves, our relations with others, the structures of  power in which we are embedded and our complicity
in creating and sustaining those structures’ (p. 3). Our f ragile world can never be f ully mended. Yet, this
recognition ought not lead to despair and resignation. Instead, evoking Paul Klee’s Angelus Dubiosus, who
‘gives voice to its suf f ering and moves f orward (and backward) in an attempt to reengage ethically and
polit ically’ (p. 47), Rose suggests we ought to bear ‘humorous witness’ to the world, ‘trying, f ailing, learning
and trying again’ (p.53) in the pursuit of  a good enough justice.
Schick suggests that the ‘cornerstone’ of  Rose’s contribution to polit ical thought lies in her speculative
Hegelianism. Indeed, in Hegel’s ‘triune structure of  recognition’, Rose f inds an escape f rom Kantian
dualisms. Like Adorno, hers is a radical Hegel. Yet unlike Lef t and Right Hegelians, she embraces Hegel’s
system and method in its totality as a resource f or ‘thinking ethically and polit ically’ (p.28). This militates
against the simplicity of  a rules-based system, the impossibility of  knowing and of f ers instead the
possibility of  the ethical. This involves wrestling with what Hegel termed the ‘double danger’ of  the aporetic,
or self  interest masquerading as the moral law and the agapic, or the Pietistic retreat f rom the polit ical. And
although it is characterised by dif f iculty and striving, it allows f or the possibility of  progress, the
rehabilitation of  reason. In essence, Rose’s speculative Hegelianism allows her to transcend the limitations
of  liberalism and postmodernism, grounding polit ical action in the space between.
For Schick, the cosmopolitan dilemma is but one debate that benef its f rom Rose’s speculative Hegelianism.
Cosmopolitanism, in its elevation of  a liberal rights regime and the abstract universality that underpins it
would appear to act to supress the experience of  the Other (p.81). A polit ics of  alterity, however, promotes
yet another essentialism grounded in the reif ication of  the Other (p.82). Facing this dilemma, Schick’s Rose
embraces the middle. She posits an aporetic (or dif f icult) universalism, which simultaneously rejects the
abstraction of  law and embraces the legal system as a site f or recognition.
What Schick achieves in 130 pages is impressive. She of f ers an exposition of  Rose’s thought, grounds it in
its f ormative philosophical inf luences and sets it in conversation with problems in contemporary polit ical
philosophy. And she does this cogently, without signif icantly sacrif icing breadth or depth. Perhaps a
weakness of  Schick’s work is its f ailure to grapple with Rose’s Judaism and Protestantism and its impact
on her polit ical thought. Perhaps her section on speculative polit ics f ails to f ully articulate the practical
implications of  Rose’s thought f rom transit ional justice to development. Indeed, in her bid to simplif y Rose
one wonders if  she unf airly systematises her thought, as Simon Speck discusses in his review in Radical
Philosophy. Nonetheless, in the questions she asks and leaves unanswered, Schick’s work is a compelling
invitation to read more Gillian Rose.
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